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HOW EISENHOWER IEWS IS RESIDENCY

HARD WILSON


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By **RICHARD WILSON**

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
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In a chaotic world of ceaseless change, Eisenhower believes that his foreign policy has been a great success. He takes it for granted that he would have carried the nation through eight years without war, with peak prosperity and without authoritarian Government controls. That simple summary, which might be history's judgment, does not impress him too much. His mind is on the revolutionary movement
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Eisenhower is convinced that Khrushchev was sincere in his desire for acceptance as a respectable world leader, but was forced to wreck the Summit conference by Red China, Russian Stalinists and serious internal difficulties.

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As he nears the end of his second term, he often recalls "crises" in which he was urged to take action and did not. In his resistance to action for action's sake, and his calm when the nation was near hysteria, he thinks he was much oftener right than wrong.


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Such leaders, the dictators, are already doomed in the march of history, the President thinks. What counts now, and will count more in the future, is the relation of the world's peoples to one another.

He believes that he has done much to promote intimate relationships on a people-to-people level. This is vitally important, he thinks, because it will create a world atmosphere in which the work of the diplomats can go forward.

Success or failure of a single conference, or several of them, is not the important thing. Problems of a century cannot be solved in a day, or a week, or a year. They may be solved when the world's people, in their various geographic and ethnic divisions, understand one another.

It is for these reasons that President Eisenhower is proud of his own visits abroad and of the fact that, during his Administration, more foreign leaders have knocked on the White House door than in all previous history.

Thus, with all the misadventures of the relationship with Nikita S. Khrushchev, the President has his mind on the positive side. He remembers that, on some vital matters, he is in agreement with the Soviet Premier.

At Camp David, in the Catocin Mountains, when Soviet-American relations were looking up, Khrushchev, in effect, said to Eisenhower, "The arms burden is too great even for such a rich country as the United States, and for us too." And the President remembers that he refused to discuss China with Khrushchev and that that was all.

The President also remembers Khrushchev in Paris, trying to inject himself into the American

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One of the worst events of his Administration, as Eisenhower sees it, may have been the phony story, which backfired, put out to "cover" the U-2 incident. But intelligence officials were avidly eager for the photographs of the Soviet military potential they knew they could get during these flights. They were perhaps too prone to ignore the President's warning of what the consequences might be if a U-2 mission failed and the plane came down in Russia.

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Even now, there is no point in being served by reaction to Khrushchev's intemperate and savage attacks. If Eisenhower had not already known

lately wrong in turning back a man with eminent qualifications for public service for blatant political reasons. If the President had his way now, the Senate would be required to muster a two-thirds majority to reject Presidential appointees in the Executive Department. This would apply to Cabinet and high administrative appointees only.

Eisenhower also has in mind some other basic changes in Government. He would have members of the House of Representatives elected at four-year intervals at the time of the Presidential elections, instead of for two-year terms. The President has previously advocated this, but ran into a simple but overpowering political objection: One third of the Senate is elected at each biennial election. If House members served for four years, some of them could run against senators up for re-election without giving up their House seats.

In every election, a good many members of the House aspire to run for the Senate, and more would actually do so if they could also hang onto their House seats. The President has a plan to correct this political defect. Any one running for office would first be required to resign any elective position he already holds (except candidates running for re-election).

A congressman serving a four-year term thus would have to resign if he ran for the Senate midway in his term. The President would have this requirement apply to all elective offices, Federal and state.

Another constitutional change Eisenhower seeks is the power to veto individual items in appropriation bills. As matters now stand, a President must veto the complete bill or sign it. He cannot veto parts or sections. With item-veto authority, a President could knock undesirable pork-barrel projects out of a public-works bill without killing the whole bill.

Some states now have the item veto. Eisenhower is known to reason that state constitutional conventions would be likely to approve the procedure for the nation, and hopes the conventions will be called.

Many of the recommendations that come quickly to Eisenhower's mind grow from his relationships with Congress, the relationships of a Republican President with a Democratic Congress. He is known to suspect that this condition may continue for a long time. One party will have to win the Presidency because of their national following. Another party will have the local political machinery necessary to win the House and Senate.

First blunders

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Even now, there is no point to be served by reaction to Khrushchev's intemperate and savage attacks. If Eisenhower had not already known it when he entered the White House, he would have learned one lesson: All hope of future agreement ends when the motives of those with whom you are dealing are attacked or questioned.

Other things galled the President more when he looks back over eight years. One of these is the Senate's refusal to confirm his nominee for Secretary of Commerce, Lewis L. Strauss. It stands out in his recollection that the Senate was abso-

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Since voters generally seem to regard such an arrangement as O.K., something must be done to make it workable. During his early years in the White House, the President thought that he could use his well-known capacity to make divergent groups co-operate to develop a satisfactory personal arrangement with the Democratic Congress.

But as time went on, Eisenhower discovered

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The President also remembers Khrushchev in Paris, trying to inject himself into the American political campaign. In their single meeting preceding the Summit that didn't happen, Eisenhower laughed at him openly when Khrushchev spoke of negotiating with the next American President. Eisenhower's laughter earned him a severe look from the Soviet Premier.

But the President believes that his series of contacts at Camp David and in Paris has shown that even the Kremlin and the White House

can be in agreement on some common ground. One of the worst aspects of his Administration, as Eisenhower sees it, may have been the phony story, which backfired, put out to "cover" the U-2 incident. But intelligence officials were avidly eager for the photographs of the Soviet military potential they knew they could get during these flights. They were perhaps too prone to ignore the President's warning of what the consequences might be if a U-2 mission failed and the plane came down in Russia.

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that politics is thicker than co-operation in Congress during peacetime. That is apparently why he has been preoccupied with proposals for changes in relations between Congress and the White House.

Eisenhower is clearly impatient with those who talk of his "lack of leadership." His theory is that those he directs or influences can be frightened into action, but when the fear leaves, so do those who are supposed to help him. He is contemptuous of leaders who rely on banging the desk and exhorting underlings to action. The President remembers a quotation from Napoleon that the French were ecstatic in victory and hysterical in defeat. He sometimes recalls, too, another French quotation to the general effect that the wisdom of statesmanship lies in doing the average thing while everyone else is wildly demanding impetuous action.

So Eisenhower avoided hysteria in defeat, and when impetuous action was demanded, he was more likely to do the "average thing." He recalls the Sputnik hysteria, and the speech he made in Oklahoma urging calm. Now, he notes that American satellite launchings are so common that some barely make page one of the newspapers.

It is the same with the state of American defense. In the President's view, everyone now knows that the American defense position is better than it has ever been, with inner Pentagon rivalries at a minimum.

He has tried, in these critical matters, to persuade the American people to reason coolly and calmly, rather than base demands for action on suddenly stirred emotions.

Eisenhower is known to consider his handling of the 1957-58 depression as an illustration of the value of this approach. When the first signs of an economic sag began to appear in late 1957, the President refused to panic. Democrats in Congress clamored for immediate action. Later the "unemployed" held a rally in Washington, addressed by Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson. The President moved cautiously. He used indirect economic controls. He also advocated and got from Congress extension of unemployment compensation with continued state participation and an expansion of the highway program. By late spring, a pickup began. Unemployment dropped on about the schedule he had forecast.

Continuously through his Administration, it has been perhaps more on the President's mind than on the public's that he was arresting previous trends and correcting old infamies. The public tended to forget the "liberalism" of the New Deal-Fair Deal (a phrase also quickly dropped by Eisenhower), the low

act, however many may have been involved in conflict-of-interest cases.

He may wish to write something about the conflict-of-interest question when he leaves the White House. He is known to suspect that the statute on the matter tends to force selection of subordinate officials who haven't been successful enough to amass much of the world's goods. Also he suspects that ownership of a few shares of stock is not sufficient to disqualify a good man from Government service.

Furthermore, if conflict-of-interest limitations are to apply to Executive Department officials, why shouldn't they also apply to members of Congress? It would be a good thing to make them applicable to senators and congressmen, Eisenhower is known to think, though some of his associates tell him there wouldn't be many members of Congress left. Many congressmen, it is pointed out, vote without hesitation on issues that may mean their private loss or gain.

If the President publicly advocated applying the statute to congressmen, his proposal could cause some embarrassment on Capitol Hill.

On another important matter, Eisenhower thinks his successors will be compelled to follow his lead. He is known to believe that no President in the future can wisely relegate the Vice-Presidency to its former standby status in the Government. Because of the possibility of a President's death or disability, and the intense pressures of modern statecraft, the Vice-President must be ready, in every sense, to take over the Presidency at any time. Records found by President Eisenhower in the White House indicated that the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt had seen his Vice-President, Harry S. Truman, only six times before Truman was called to take over the duties of the Chief Executive.

Future Presidents, Eisenhower believes, should feel compelled to make their Vice-Presidents working members of the Administration, fully informed in every detail.

As Eisenhower prepares to leave office, he is more convinced than ever that the middle of the road is the right way. He reflects on a speech he made September 3, 1949, while president of Columbia University. These principles he thinks he has successfully carried through in the Presidency.

"The middle of the road," he said in that talk, "is derided by all of the right and the left. It is a neutral, wishy-washy one. Yet here is the truly creative area in which we may obtain agree-

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
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
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As he ends his second term, President Eisenhower is content that the fair-minded believe he was right when he made that statement—and has proved it during his Presidency.



For Richard Wilson's plus-and-minus report on Ike's White House years, turn the page

Eisenhower is clearly impatient with those who talk of his "lack of leadership." His theory is that those he did not expect to be taken into action, but when the fear leaves, so do those who are supposed to help him. He is contemptuous of leaders who rely on banging the desk and exhorting underlings to action. The President remembers a quotation from Napoleon that the French were ecstatic in victory and hysterical in defeat. He sometimes recalls, too, another French quotation to the general effect that the wisdom of statesmanship lies in doing the average thing while everyone else is wildly demanding impetuous action.

So Eisenhower avoided hysteria in defeat, and when impetuous action was demanded, he was more likely to do the "average thing." He recalls the Sputnik hysteria, and the speech he made in Oklahoma urging calm. Now, he notes that American satellite launchings are so common that some barely make page one of the newspapers.

It is the same with the state of American defense. In the President's view, everyone now knows that the American defense position is better than it has ever been, with inner Pentagon rivalries at a minimum.

He has tried, in these critical matters, to persuade the American people to reason coolly and calmly, rather than base demands for action on suddenly stirred emotions.

Eisenhower is known to consider his handling of the 1957-58 depression as an illustration of the value of this approach. When the first signs of an economic sag began to appear in late 1957, the President refused to panic. Democrats in Congress clamored for immediate action. Later the "unemployed" held a rally in Washington, addressed by Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson. The President moved cautiously. He used indirect economic controls. He also advocated and got from Congress extension of unemployment compensation with continued state participation and an expansion of the highway program. By late spring, a pickup began. Unemployment dropped on about the schedule he had forecast.

Continuously through his Administration, it has been perhaps more on the President's mind than on the public's that he was arresting previous trends and correcting old infamies. The public tended to forget what was past—the "creeping socialism" of the New Deal-Fair Deal (a phrase also quickly dropped by Eisenhower), the low level of people's opinion of "Truman's cronies," "the scandalous years" and other aspects of the Truman era.

But to Eisenhower, his mandate to curb the growth of centralization and restore the dignity of the Federal Government and respect for its officials apparently remained a live matter. It comes to his mind as his last term wanes that no official of his Administration was accused of a criminal

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

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
ON JANUARY 20, 1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower, victorious General of the Armies and President of the United States, will have reached another historic milestone. He will have been the first full two-term Republican President since Grant left the White House 84 years earlier. White House years have been in every sense a marked by the end of the Korean War, the jet and missile and television era, the satellites into space, world revolution, racial turmoil, crisis piling on crisis. It was the unblemished prosperity and dizzy stock prices, the rock 'n' roll and payola, of split-level ranch houses

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
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